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Paul Ricoeur 
Alexandros Schismenos — January 15, 2018 
On March 9th, 1985, Paul Ricoeur and Cornelius Castoriadis 
met at the studio of the France Culture “Le Bon Plaisir” radio 
broadcaster. In 2016, the transcript of their dialogue, their only public 
debate, was published [1]. This publication is significant not only 
because it highlights the points of convergence and divergence 
between the two prominent thinkers, but also because the issues 
they discuss: the relation between society and history, tradition and 
creativity, imagination and collective action, are relevant to the 
philosophical and political discourse of our time. 
It is apparent in their dialogue that the two philosophers share 
a common ground, as regards the eminence of the imagination in 
human existence and culture, the refusal to reduce politics to the 
economy and their shared emphasis on the relation between 
consciousness and society. However, these are also significant 
points of divergence, since Castoriadis considers imagination 
creative and radical, while Ricoeur considers it more interpretative. 
Moreover, Castoriadis considers the self-institution of society an ex 
nihilo creation of a proper world, while for Ricoeur it is an 
interpretation of a given, though not fixed, world horizon. Castoriadis 
insists on the project of individual and social autonomy through 
democratic social transformation, and the possibility of actually 
overcoming heteronomy. Heteronomy is used by Castoriadis to 
define alienation both on the level of the individual, as the domination 
of unconscious drives and internalized norms over the conscious self, 
and on the social level, as the instituted authority that sanctifies 
dominant institutions and conceals the fact that these institutions are 
society’s own creations. On the other hand, Ricoeur considers social 
heteronomy as a necessary ‘evil’ (le mal) of the political sphere that 
can be contained but not eliminated from social existence. 
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Castoriadis began the dialogue with a humorous reference to 
his incomplete dissertation on the “imaginary element”, which 
remained “elementary and imaginary[2]“, and which was the reason 
for his first acquaintance with Paul Ricoeur. The two thinkers met for 
the first time in 1967 in Nanterre, when Castoriadis asked Ricoeur to 
supervise his dissertation on “The Imaginary Element in History”, 
which, would, however, never be completed. Their encounter 
occurred after Castoriadis had broken with Marxism and turned to 
psychoanalysis and ontology. He had accused Marx of adopting 
essential elements of the dominant capitalist worldview, such as 
scientific rationalism, the predominance of the economy, and 
dominance over nature. Then he undertook the task to combine 
action and theory within the praxis of autonomy beyond Marxist 
dialectics, while his main philosophical ideas such as autonomy, and 
his emphasis on the creativity of the instituting imaginary in and 
through the activity of an anonymous collective, first appear in that 
political context[3]. 
When Castoriadis published his magnum opus, The Imaginary 
Institution of Society, in 1975, the reasons that led him to the rupture 
with Marxist rationalism also lead him to a rupture with traditional 
philosophy, to which he assigns the label ‘ensemblistic/identitary’ [4]. 
Thus, while Ricoeur presented his own critique of Marx during his 
Chicago lectures, Castoriadis moved on to a critique of the western 
philosophical tradition more generally. 
Castoriadis uses the term ‘ensemblistic/identitary’ to describe 
the traditional ontology and logic that is based on the axioms of 
identity and non-contradiction, which considers the definitive and 
unchangeable Being as the only true Being. On that theoretical 
ground rationalistic or tautological philosophical systems that try to 
reduce ontological multiplicity to some transcendent uniformity and 
temporal becoming to static eternity are constructed. Castoriadis 
claims that this leads traditional philosophy to obscure the 
inseparable connection between society and history, existence and 
temporality and to negate ontological creativity and time itself. 
Without the acknowledgment of ontological creativity and historical 
relativity, he argues, we cannot understand how human activity 
transforms the world and how society creates its own history. 
According to Castoriadis, what this traditional 
(ensemblistic/identitary) logic fails to understand is the creative or 
poetic dimension of reality, which is densely interwoven with the 
ensemblistic/identitary dimension. This means that the creation of 
new forms or beings cannot be reduced to previous conditions, such 
is the emergence of life. Traditional ontology aspires to reduce the 
plurality of beings, ontological multiplicity, to a single unified Being or 
principle. However, Castoriadis claims that there are ontological 
levels or strata that cannot be reduced to a single principle or to each 
other, such as the natural physical stratum, the living being, the 
human psyche and the social-historical, each with unique attributes 
that constitute different proper worlds. Time is the emergence of 
alterity, the creation and destruction of new forms, and both the 
tautological and the creative dimensions are interwoven within time 
and space. 
The notion that Castoriadis uses to describe ontological 
stratification is the magma: “A magma is that from which one can 
extract (or in which one can construct) an indefinite number of 
ensemblist organizations but which can never be reconstituted 
(ideally) by a (finite or infinite) ensemblist composition of these 
organizations [5].” 
For Castoriadis, ontological creativity is the reason for historical 
relativity. Every human society creates its own history, establishes its 
own institutions and a unique public space and public time that 
cannot be attributed to extra-social forces, such as God, or human 
nature, which means that there are no historical laws or destiny. The 
social-historical is the proper world of human existence, created by 
the anonymous collective imaginary and realized in institutions and 
human activity, which leans on the natural environment but is not 
determined by it. 
As an example of ontological creativity, Castoriadis mentions 
the Being-for-Itself[6] ( être pour soi), the being that institutes itself 
and whose finality refers to itself[7]. Such is any living being, from the 
simplest to the most complex species, that creates a variety of 
assessments of its environment and informs its proper world 
according to its own senses, for self-preservation and reproduction. 
The distinction between any other living being and humanity, 
according to Castoriadis, is the deformity of human imagination [8], 
which creates a constant flux of psychic images that generate urges 
aiming to ends other than the basic biological purpose of self-
preservation [9]. Psychic intention is arbitrary, its content is 
imaginary, its passion illogical. Human psyche is a distinct being-for-
itself whose sufficient and necessary condition for survival is society, 
which transforms the psyche into a functional individual, in 
accordance to the dominant social images and significances. These 
are the creation of another psychic pole, the anonymous social 
imaginary (imaginaire), which is transmitted through language, 
custom and social behavior. Ricoeur also pointed out the importance 
of the involuntary, as he named it, element of the social background 
in the constitution of the conscious ego, but, as we will see, he gives 
more emphasis to the symbolic over the imaginary. 
For Castoriadis, the social imaginary is responsible for 
providing reality with a coherent meaning available to the individual 
psyche in order to reconcile the trauma of the breakup of the initial 
psychical monad that comes with birth. Castoriadis refers here to 
Freud and perceives the newborn psyche as an enclosed unity of 
meaning, being and pleasure, that is broken up through socialization 
and the separation of the Self and the Other, with the Other 
remaining a necessary component of the constitution of the Self[10]. 
Creative imagination, which Castoriadis calls primary or radical, and 
which precedes productive imagination, is the source of every 
signification and representation, the common root of both the real 
and the symbolic. 
On this path Castoriadis met Paul Ricoeur, who also places 
imagination at the center of existence. In his doctoral thesis, 
titled Philosophie de la Volonté I: Le Volontaire et l’Involontaire, 
Ricoeur maintains that the polarity between subjective and objective 
is constitutive of human experience. The involuntary, manifested as 
objective environment, as bodily functions, as the network of 
relationships with others, determines and complements voluntary 
intention, selection and action. Ricoeur insists that man is not an 
isolated ego, but “this plural and collective unity in which the unity of 
the destination and the difference of destinies are to be understood 
through each other” [11]. To rephrase this, the individual self is not a 
static solitary entity but a dynamic plexus of relations where the 
others always participate, in actuality or in memory, as persons or 
influences, and where the individual is always signified in relation to 
others and to a common world. This unity is achieved through mutual 
recognition and shared communication. For Ricoeur, communication 
and recognition provide us with meaning when our activity 
corresponds to the pre-existing structure of the world. Our actions 
become meaningful within cultural and natural contexts, which are 
not our subjective creations, but precede and define our conceptual 
orientation. However, new meaning emerges, in any given context, 
within the process of communication and language that allows 
constant re-interpretations. The mental faculty that ensures the 
openness and fluidity of meaning, as well as the possibility of mutual 
recognition, is imagination. 
In this context, as M. Foessel notes, imagination “allows 
meaning to be understood, the world to be expressible and action to 
be feasible” [12]. Since understanding requires recognition and 
communication, Ricoeur turns to language and symbolism. “The 
symbol creates thought [13]” he contends, delimiting the imaginary in 
favor of the symbolic, which will lead to a devaluation of imaginative 
creativity in favor of interpretation. For Ricoeur, imaginary meaning is 
not an arbitrary creation, but rather a free, non-regular re-
interpretation of elements already given to human experience by the 
world and culture. Hence, interpretation is free and diverse but does 
not constitute the creation of a new form or being. For Ricoeur, 
imagination is interpretative. Self-understanding of pre-existing 
meaningful contexts is made possible through images preserved in 
memory and imagination by literary tradition, which determines the 
cultural context in which we live and which is offered to 
interpretation. [14] This notion will also mark Ricoeur’s “linguistic” turn 
to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
In 1975, the year in which Castoriadis’Imaginary Institution of 
Society was published, Ricoeur published Le Metaphore Vive, where 
he highlights metaphor as the imaginative innovation within 
language. Metaphors generate new significations and are essentially 
an imaginary reconstruction of meaning. In ordinary speech, a 
metaphor is a vector of the multiple possibilities of meaningful re-
interpretation that can be achieved through imaginary innovation. 
Imagination produces a common, socially valid meaning as a 
metaphorical background. Thus, Ricoeur correlates phenomenology 
with hermeneutics, expanding the hermeneutical method from textual 
analysis to the interpretation of the interaction of the Self with the 
Other. From Husserl he adopted the concept of the Welthorizon, or 
world horizon, the unified and unifying ontological world background 
that makes experience possible. In relation to the interpretation of the 
metaphor as a transformation of meaning, Ricoeur stresses the 
distinction between the obvious meaning and the concealed or 
hidden meaning. He considers philosophy to be an interpretive 
activity that traces a hidden meaning within the context of the obvious 
meaning that comes to light through culture[15]. 
It is important that Ricoeur was a faithful member of the French 
Reformation Church, and the idea of God as an actual being, 
as the form of Being, intertwined with the social significance of the 
Sacred, provides him with the metaphysical foundation of an 
unimaginable world-meaning and the transcendental bridge of from 
the interpretation of texts to the interpretation of Being. This 
theological component of the world limits the creativity of imagination 
to reinterpretation. 
In that same year, 1975, Ricoeur, while lecturing at the 
University of Chicago[16], also criticized Marx for separating social 
phenomena between “superstructure” cultural elements and “base” 
economic relations. Ricoeur emphasizes the central role of the 
“tradition of authority”, which incorporates new institutions into long-
lasting historical narratives. Ricoeur locates the main social 
antagonisms within the tension between tradition and innovation, 
since tradition sets the framework for innovation and social 
transformations are more successful when they are part of the 
‘tradition of authority’. Somehow, the “evil” of dominance, authority 
and alienation seems to remain as a residue through social 
transformations, although each social construct is in itself new in 
relation to the former. Thus, History can be understood through the 
historical narrative that refers to a historical structure, which of course 
remains open to restructuring. Temporality is considered a nexus of 
chronological and historiographical narratives, as analyzed in 
Ricoeur’s later work Temps et Récit. 
On the contrary, Castoriadis insists on the possibility of 
overcoming social heteronomy through the establishment of social 
autonomy. For Castoriadis, the tension exists between the instituted 
social imaginary and the instituting social imaginary, in other words, 
between the consolidation of institutions and the creativity of society. 
Thus, autonomy means direct and reflective self-government, where 
institutions are placed under public democratic deliberation and 
individuals, as free subjectivities, are equally involved in political 
power. 
In his article “Time and Creation”, Castoriadis agrees with 
Ricoeur’s analysis , that there are two main traditional philosophical 
approaches to temporality. [17] One is the objective or 
cosmological approach, presented in Aristotle’sPhysics, which 
considers time an objective attribute of reality, the measurement of 
the movement of natural change and deterioration. The other is 
the subjective or phenomenological approach, presented in St. 
Augustine’s Confessions, which considers time a subjective 
phenomenon, the internal rhythm of personal experience and 
existential anxiety. Both approaches, Castoriadis notes, fail to 
address the question of time per se, time in-itself which lies above 
subjective experience, and beyond natural change, encompassing 
and unifying them. 
Both approaches, Castoriadis asserts, propose a rigid division 
between subjectivity and objectivity, ignoring society, where time is 
history, where subjects and objects are represented and invested 
with imaginary social significations, where subjectivity and objectivity 
are combined into social meaning. 
Castoriadis claims that the real antithesis is located between 
the psyche and society, since the actual individual himself/herself is 
already a social institution, informed by language and culture. Even 
our subjective perception of ourselves is mediated by words, norms 
and images that do not belong to ourselves but refer to a public 
imaginary, already instituted before we were born. 
Secondly, the division is also false on an epistemological level, 
since the very conception of any object (as a signified and evaluated 
object), can only be constituted by the subject according to the 
dominant social imaginary significations that are already invested in 
the object. For example, the meaning or value of a tool cannot be 
restricted to just its practical use, because it connotes also ideas, 
concepts and attitudes and symbolizes a broader culture. The 
subjective and the objective dimensions cannot be ultimately divided. 
Their intrinsic connection remains incomprehensible only if we 
continue to ignore the social-historical dimension that our collective 
existence and activities generate which transfigures, interconnects 
and signifies everything that exists within the scope of humanity. 
For Castoriadis, the antithesis between the psyche and society 
is bridged by the conscious ego, socially informed through education 
and communication that transforms inner drives to internalized social 
norms and dominant significations. Language is the carrier of social 
significations in the broader sense of communicative expression that 
includes oral, corporeal and visual semantics. 
These significations, that regulate personal feelings, drives and 
conceptions, precede every person, since society is in-itself a magma 
of imaginary significations, norms, social structures and behavioral 
patterns. Consequently, human subjectivity and individuality are, for 
Castoriadis, historical categories and not anthropological constants. 
In simpler words, the concept of the free, autonomous individual does 
not appear in any society, but in a society that recognizes the 
concept of a free, autonomous community. Individuality and human 
subjectivity are significations that have risen from the struggle against 
heteronomy and absolute authority. Subjective temporality is also 
interconnected with the broader magma of social time which emerges 
on the surface of the even broader magma of natural time, all of the 
above forming, without ever covering the magma of Time in-
itself [18]. 
Thus, for the atheist Castoriadis, history, inherent in every 
society, is the place and the result of a radical human creation. As 
regards Castoriadis, God is a primary social imaginary 
signification [19], a human creation. For Castoriadis, instituted 
religion that conceals the ontological Abyss and negates mortality 
and human freedom is the foundation of heteronomy. In Greek the 
word hierarchy, authority of the sacred reveals religious authority as 
the origin of State authority, which is the instituted form of political 
heteronomy. 
In contrast, Ricoeur views human creation as re-creation, since 
radical creation, belongs only to God, which exists as the 
metaphysical unity of the concealed, primal meaning of the world. For 
Ricoeur a heteronomous element is always present in the form of the 
evil that resides in the political sphere, and while he does not place 
God as the subordinator of human activity in any sense, he does 
perceive the sacred element as part of the involuntary necessary 
constituent of the human Welthorizon, an immanence of heteronomy. 
It is not so strange that Ricoeur made a mistake during their 
radio dialogue, calling Castoriadis’ magnum opus as‘The Imaginary 
Production of Society’. This also reveals Ricoeur’s disagreement with 
the Castoriadean idea of ex nihilo creation. Although Castoriadis 
insists that ex nihilo does not mean in nihilo nor cum nihilo, for 
Ricoeur ex nihilo means nothing. 
In conclusion, Ricoeur views human imagination manifested 
through the interpretation of a concealed primal meaning offered by 
the structure of the world, open to countless different re-
interpretations, because the imaginary is ultimately interpretive. 
Castoriadis, on the other hand, insists that human imagination is 
radically creative, the source of arbitrary social imaginary 
significations, the source of society and reality. 
The dialogue between Castoriadis and Ricoeur reinvigorates 
the philosophical discourse on imagination, social creativity and 
collective action. The convergent points of their theories, the primacy 
of imagination, the openness of human history and the affirmation of 
free collective action refer to the central problematic of modernity, the 
tension between structures of instituted authority and society’s 
instituting power. However their perspectives diverge, since Ricoeur 
is more conservative, stressing the traditional element of instituted 
authority, while Castoriadis is radical, emphasizing human creativity 
and the possibility of social autonomy and direct democracy. Despite 
their disagreements, their personal relationship was a relation of 
mutual recognition. 
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